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MATRIMONIAL REGIMES
Robert A. Pascal*
COMMUNITY OF GAINS ALWAYS CONTRACTED,
NEVER IMPOSED BY LAW

Dictum in Williams v. Williams' states that "[t]he community of...
gains is imposed . . . by operation of law absent a contrary stipulation in a
marriage contract. La. Civil Code arts. 2329, 2332, 2399 (1870)." If for no
other reason, this dictum would be erroneous under Louisiana Revised
Statutes 9:264, added by Act 693 of 1975, which speaks of "the conclusive
presumption of law that spouses who have not entered into a marriage
contract before marriage did contract tacitly the community of gains."
This legislation of 1975, however, merely confirms what has been true
since 1825. Before 1825 the community of gains was a "necessary
consequence" of marriage and hence "superinduced of right" or imposed
by law.2 The Digest of 1808, consistently, did not permit modification or
exclusion of the community of gains and contained no articles on a
separation of property by marriage contract. The Civil Code of 1825
introduced these changes. 3 The new possibility of altering or excluding the
community of gains rendered the laws on the subject suppletive rather than
imperative and, of logical necessity, converted the community regime from
one imposed by law to one which the spouses, as persons presumed to know
the law, tacitly contracted in the absence of stipulations to the contrary. The
language of articles 2332 and 2399, according to which the community is
"imposed by law" or "superinduced of right" (i.e., as a matter of law) in
the absence of a stipulation to the contrary, must be understood to signify no
more than that the "imposition" or "superinduction" is by suppletive law,
the very function of which is to supply the rights and obligations which
persons may well be presumed to have intended to accept when they have
not contracted expressly on a subject. 4
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 331 So. 2d 438 (La. 1976).
2. La. Digest of 1808, arts. 10 & 65, pp. 320 & 336.
3. See La. Civ. Code arts. 2312, 2394-98, and 2639 (1825), now found as LA.
CIv. CODE arts. 2332, 2392-96 and 2399.
4. This understanding of the essentially contractual nature of the "legal"
regime has predominated in French legal opinion since the decision in the case of the
spouses Ganey, by the Parlement of Paris, in 1525. See II BATIFFOL, DROIT INTERNA-
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The point is of immense practical importance. Inasmuch as the
"legal" community is contracted, not imposed by law, changes in the law
pertaining to the "legal" community cannot be made effective for persons
already married unless the law gives them the right to agree to the changes
and they do agree to them mutually in the manner provided by law.
Heretofore, however, no Louisiana legislation amending the legal regime
has ever offered persons already under it the right to agree to the changes
made by the amendment, and the general law forbids the alteration of
matrimonial regimes by convention. 5 An equally important consequence of
the contractual nature of the "legal" community is that it can have direct
consequences only between the spouses themselves. Third persons may
have rights and obligations against and toward the spouses as individuals,
but not against a "community." It is not an entity, but only a contract
6
between husband and wife.
ALIMONY FOR HUSBAND'S RELATIVES

Connell v. Connell' presented the question whether the husband must
account to the wife, on dissolution of the community of gains, for one-half
the community funds expended by him to pay alimony to his first wife and to
children of the first marriage. All justices agreed he was not obliged to
account in any way. The majority properly characterized the alimentary
obligations as legal obligations arising during marriage. 8 Next, however,
the majority noted the literal language of article 2403, that "the debts
contracted during the marriage. . . must be acquitted out of the common
fund," and concluded from this that no accounting was due the wife.
The writer agrees that, if there is a community of gains between the
spouses, the legislation ought to provide that the alimentary obligations of
n°618 (5th ed. 1971). Some contrary analyses are mentioned by
Batiffol, supra at n 619, but the reasons on which they are based are not relevant to
TIONAL PRIVm,

the usual situation.
5. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2329 provides the general rule. Two exceptions not
relevant here are contained in Civil Code articles 155 and 2329.
6. Pascal, Updating Louisiana's Community of Gains, 49 TUL L. REV. 555,
555-57 (1975).
7. 331 So. 2d 4 (La. 1976).
8. One justice characterized the obligation as an antenuptial legal obligation,
but argued an exception to article 2403's rule "rationalized on the basis that the State
occupies a status unlike other creditors." Id. at 8, 9. The writer submits that the State
is not a "creditor" under the alimony laws. The alimony laws are of public concern,
therefore imperative laws rather than suppletive laws, but the State cannot be
considered a "creditor" under them. Only the person to whom alimony is owed is a
"creditor" in this context.
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each spouse are obligations of the husband so far as third persons are
concerned, but payable, as between husband and wife, from the community
fund and therefore without any obligation to account. But this solution
cannot be admitted under article 2403. In the context of other articles of the
Civil Code, article 2403 must be restricted to obligations not only incurred
during the marriage, but pertaining to a matter of common concern to the
spouses., Article 2403 itself, for example, affirms that antenuptial debts
should be paid out of the separate funds of the obliged spouse, and it is
suggested here that the rule is so because antenuptial obligations are not a
matter of common concern. Article 2408 also evidences the same principle
in requiring the spouse whose separate assets have been improved or
augmented with community assets or energies to reimburse the other spouse
one-half the value of the improvements or augmentations. Finally, it may be
observed that it is extremely doubtful the justices would have judged the
husband not obliged to account for one-half the community funds used by
him to discharge debts he had incurred during marriage by accepting an
insolvent succession. Yet a literal construction of article 2403 would require
this result. In the context of these observations, therefore, the meaning of
article 2403 may not be considered free from doubt and the article should be
construed in the light of the principles underlying the community of gains
that are ascertainable from all the texts on the subject. Article 2403, then,
must be construed as requiring, as between the spouses, the payment from
community funds of only those obligations incurred during the marriage that
9
relate to matters of common concern to them.
HUSBAND'S LIABILITY FOR WIFE'S PURCHASES
ON HER SEPARATE

ACCOUNT

The decision in McCary's Shreve City Jewelers, Inc. v. Saucier' °
cannot be approved. A wife not living with her husband, but not separated
from bed and board, sought to purchase a diamond from a jeweler and to
have him mount it in her husband's class ring, all with a view to making the
husband a surprise donation. Fully aware of the facts, the jeweler agreed to
charge her alone for the diamond and its mounting. The diamond was
supplied, the work done, and the wife made the surprise donation of the
improved ring to her husband. Later the jeweler demanded payment from
the husband, and the husband did cause a corporation of which he was
president to pay a small amount toward the total cost of the diamond and
mounting. On these facts the court gave judgment for the jeweler, reasoning
9.
10.

Pascal, supra note 6, at 558-61.
318 So. 2d 671 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1975).
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(1) that the debt had been contracted "for the benefit of the husband," (2)
that, therefore, it could be ratified by him, and (3) that he did ratify it both by
his failure to repudiate his wife's transaction and his payment of part of the
price.
There is serious error in the reasoning. The wife had not entered into a
contract on her husband's account as principal, but on her own account, for
her own benefit, that is to say, to make her husband a donation. There was
no transaction, therefore, which the husband could repudiate and none
which he could ratify. One may not repudiate a contract to which he is not a
party. Nor may one ratify a contract to which he was not made a party by his
own action or by that of one representing him as mandatary or negotiorum
gestor. Hence neither the husband's acceptance of the ring,'I nor his failure
to repudiate the contract, nor his payment of part of his wife's debt could
render him liable personally for her debt. He could have assumed her debt,
but the assumption of another's debt may not be proved by parol,' 2 and no
writing to that effect appears to have been in evidence.
The reader who might observe that the matter is not one of matrimonial
regimes law would be correct, but it is discussed here because the bench and
bar frequently mistakenly consider it a part of that subject. It is not
matrimonial regimes law, however, not simply because our matrimonial
regimes laws mention nothing about one spouse's liability for the debts of
the other, but also because Louisiana matrimonial regimes, being purely
contractual, 13 cannot give third persons rights against the spouses individually or collectively. In some legislations spouses are made liable to third
persons for each other's debts, but there is no rule of this kind in Louisiana
legislation. Were there any legislation to this effect it would belong either in
the general law on obligations or, better, in that on marriage.
LIABILITY OF ONE SPOUSE FOR THE DELICrs OF THE OTHER

There is no legislation on marriage, on matrimonial regimes, or on
delictual obligations which renders either spouse, as spouse, liable for the
delicts of the other. This absence of legislation hardly is an omission
through inadvertence, for the Civil Code does detail the liabilities of
parents, tutors, curators, teachers, and employers for the acts of those under

11. It is to be noted that since the wife appropriated the husband's ring for her
own purpose, and since the value of the diamond (presumably) was greater than that
of the ring in its original condition, the improved ring belonged to the wife until she
donated it to the husband. LA. CiV. CODE arts. 521-23.
12. Id. art. 2278(3).
13. See the text at notes 1-6, supra.
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their charge. There is no reason, nevertheless, why either spouse should not
be liable to third persons for the delict of the other committed while acting as
his or her "employee" or "servant." Here the general law should apply.
The fact remains, however, that there can be no justification under the
present legislation for holding one spouse liable personally for the delict of
the other committed while an employee of a third person. This, in effect, is
what was decided in Walker v. Fontenot. 4
The legislation on the community of gains does not contain any
provision clearly including the delicts of a spouse under obligations to be
shared by them.' 5 Spanish law even now is to the effect that the delictual
obligation of each spouse remains his separate obligation.' 6 Certainly there
are instances in which the unintentional delicts of one spouse should be
17
considered obligations to be shared by the spouses between themselves,
but there is no specific legislation on this point, and certainly none which
would warrant the liability of either spouse to third persons for the delicts of
the other acting otherwise than as his employee or servant. The result in
Walker v. Fontenot, therefore, must be considered correct under the
legislation.
PRODUCTS OF INDUSTRY OR LABOR

Article 2402 of the Civil Code states clearly enough that the product of
the industry or labor of each spouse is a community asset. It is not difficult to
understand that the principle underlying the rule is that each spouse
contributes his or her labor during the regime to the common fund.
Construing the article in the light of its principle, there can be no doubt that
payments received before the regime's inception or after its termination, but
for services performed or to be performed during its existence, are com14. 329 So. 2d 762 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976).
15. Under Civil Code articles 131 and 1786 construed together the husband is
liable personally to third persons for the commercial contracts of his wife who is a
public merchant with his permission if there is a community regime between them,

but the articles do not impose liability on the husband for the wife's delicts committed
in that capacity.
16. Spanish Civ. Code art. 1410 (1889). See also IX MANRESA, COMENTARIOSAL
C6DIGO CIVIL ESPAI4OL (5th ed. rev. 1950).
17. It may be argued that, as between the spouses, the liability for injury or
damage to third persons caused negligently (but not intentionally) by one of the
spouses while attending to a matter of common concern to them, or incurred
vicariously by a spouse by reason of the act of a third person for whom he or she is
responsible in a matter of common concern, should be a common obligation if there is
a community regime between them. This interspousal sharing of obligations so

incurred, however, should not imply direct liability of the non-acting spouse toward
the third person suffering the injury or damage.
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munity assets, and that sums received during the regime, but for services
performed before its inception or after its dissolution, are separate assets.
The all-important factor is whether the revenue has been generated by
industry or labor performed or expended during the regime. For this reason
the case of Due v. Due1 8 presented a false problem. The attorney spouse's
services were rendered during and after the termination of the community of
gains pursuant to a contingent fee contract entered into during the regime.
Apparently the non-attorney spouse contended the entire fee should be
considered a community asset inasmuch as the contract therefor had been
entered into during marriage, whereas apparently the attorney spouse
contended that, inasmuch as the fee was not payable unless and until the
client's cause had been won and that event had not occurred until after
termination of the regime, the entire fee was his separate property. The court
reached the correct result, remanding the case for allocation to the community assets that portion of the fee corresponding to the services rendered
before dissolution of the regime, but only after employing much more
elaborate reasoning than the issue warranted.
The decision in West v. OrtegoI9 also may be considered in the context
of the rule that the products of the industry and labor of the spouses become
community assets. The case involved the allocation of sums received after
dissolution of the community of gains, but for damages occasioned by an
injury suffered during its existence. Properly overruling Chambers v.
Chambers20 on the point, the supreme court judged that portion of the total
award which had been given for loss of earnings subsequent to the
dissolution of the community regime to be the separate property of the
injured husband. The decision does not cover all problems connected with
dissolution of the community of gains after the husband's injury, however,
and legislative attention must be addressed to the situation's manifold
inequities.
RECOVERY OF MEDICAL EXPENSES

In Charles v. Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans,21 a wife
living separate and apart from her husband for over forty years was allowed
to sue for and recover medical expenses incurred as a result of a personal
injury. The court treated the disposition as a "judicially allowed exception"
to the rule of article 686 of the Code of Civil Procedure, under which the
18.
19.

331 So. 2d 858 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976).
325 So. 2d 242 (La. 1975).

20. 259 La. 246, 249 So. 2d 896 (1971).
21. 331 So. 2d 216 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

husband is the proper party plaintiff in suits to enforce "a right of the marital
community," citing a previous decision. The writer concurs in the result,
but submits that article 686 was not involved at all. Whether a right is a
"community right" is an issue which can arise only between the spouses,
not between the spouses and third persons. This is so because, as already
mentioned in this Symposium,22 the community is a contract between
spouses specifying the manner in which they shall share their assets and
liabilities and, as such, it can have direct effects between the spouses alone.
The third party creditor or debtor may ask which spouse is his debtor or
creditor, but not whether the debt or credit is a "community" or separate
obligation or right. Even if as between the husband and wife the husband
should pay all or part of the wife's medical expenses, that fact in itself would
not render the husband liable to the suppliers of the medical services. The
husband must have contracted them either personally or through a mandatary or negotiorumgestor acting in his name, or the suppliers of the services
themselves must have acted justifiably as his gestor in rendering the
services. None of these factors appears present in Charles. Not even the
customary tacit mandate of the husband to wife to contract for ordinary
needs of the wife and family come into play here, for that tacit mandate
cannot reasonably be said to extend to a wife living separate and apart,
especially in an instance in which she has income which she is entitled to
keep as her separate property. The wife in Charles, then, appears to have
been the only party obliged for the cost of the medical services and the only
party entitled to sue to be indemnified for them.
What has been said above does not in any way deny that under the laws
on marriage, and more particularly articles 119 and 120 of the Civil Code,
the husband is obliged to support his wife. But these articles prescribe
obligations of the husband toward his wife, not obligations of the husband
toward third persons. These obligations arising under the law of marriage,
moreover, are subsidiary to the obligations of the spouses to contribute to
the expenses of the marriage, which include the medical expenses of each
spouse, in accordance with the terms of their marriage contract; 23 and these
obligations too are interspousal and have no direct bearing on the liability of
either spouse to third persons for such expenses. The wife, therefore, was
the proper party plaintiff to sue for and recover her medical expenses.
Whether the wife had a right to be reimbursed part of these medical
expenses by her husband cannot be determined on the basis of the facts
22.
23.

See text at notes 5 & 6, supra.
LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2389, 2395, and 2435.
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recited in the opinion. It may be pointed out, however, that if there is no
stipulation on the subject in an express marriage contract and the wife has
not brought a dowry, then she must contribute to the expenses of the
marriage in proportion to her and her husband's incomes, but never more
24
than half of her own.
AccouNTING PROBLEMS

The sources of difficulty
Louisiana cases dealing with indemnification for community energies
or assets used for the separate benefit of one spouse or of a third person, and
those dealing with indemnification for the use of separate assets for a matter
of common or community concern, never have been very satisfactory to
anyone. The primary underlying reason is the inadequacy of the legislation
itself. There are only three Civil Code articles on the subject: article 2403 on
the payment of debts, article 2408 on the improvement or amelioration of
separate assets with community funds, and article 2404 insofar as it permits
the husband to make donations of certain community assets, or any under
certain circumstances, as long as he does not do so with the intent to defraud
his wife. None of these articles is easy to construe or apply, and they leave
many gaps.
Already in this Symposium there has been occasion to recall the
inconsistency of the literal, apparent meaning of article 2403 of the Civil
Code with the principles of the community of gains and the necessity of
24. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2389 provides: "If all the property of the wife be
paraphernal, and she have reserved to herself the administration of it, she ought to
bear a proportion of the marriage charges, equal, if need be, to one half her income."
This article does not mention the earnings of the wife because, when it was adopted in
1808, the community of gains was a necessary part of every marriage contract and all
earnings of the wife entered the community. La. Digest of 1808, arts. 10 & 63. The
only way in which the wife could have income, therefore, was as revenue of
paraphernalia. That the principle, however, is that the wife contributes to the
marriage expenses (or charges) from all her income, even her earnings, where they
are her separate property, cannot be denied. Thus Civil Code article 2395, in the

articles on separation of property, declares the wife contributes to the marriage
expenses to the amount of one half her income in the absence of a contrary stipulation
in an express marriage contract. Usually under the community of gains the wife's
earnings become the husband's income by entering the common fund, but since 1912,
Civil Code article 2334 has provided that the earnings of the wife, living separate and
apart from her husband are her separate property. The wife in Charles was living
separate and apart from her husband, was employed, therefore enjoyed separate

income, and therefore was obliged to share the marriage charges with her husband in
the proportion decreed by article 2389.
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construing that article, as it was in Creech v. Capitol Mack, Inc.2" in a
manner consistent with those principles. Because the community assets are
part of the husband's patrimony (that is, because they are assets under his
control, whatever the respective "interests" of the spouses in them), he
may use them to pay his separate as well as community obligations, and
even his wife's (necessarily separate) obligations if he wishes, and his
creditors may obtain execution against the community assets to satisfy any
obligation incurred by him before or during the regime; but inasmuch as the
wife has no right to control community assets (whatever her "interest" in
them) they do not form part of her patrimony, she may not dispose of them,
26
and her creditors cannot obtain execution against them for her obligations.
Article 2408 has its limitations. Its terms foresee only "increases" and
"improvements" to (already acquired) separate assets of one of the
spouses. It does not mention acquisitions of separate assets with community
funds, probably because acquisitions with community funds were always
understood to be community assets, but it also neglects the problem of assets
acquired partially with community funds and partially with separate funds.
It is true that under words of article 2402 of the Civil Code superceded since
1912 even acquisitions with separate funds were community assets, but the
Civil Code has never contained a provision specifically providing for an
accounting in that case. Now that article 2402 has been superceded in part
by article 2334 as amended since 1912, things acquired with separate funds
are separate assets, but there is yet no article regulating the acquisition of a
thing partially with separate assets and partially with community assets or
energies. Finally, the husband's authority under article 2404 to donate
movables by particular title to anyone without an accounting is limited only
by the provision of the same article giving the wife or her heirs the right to
demand from (the husband or) his heirs half the value of that disposed of by
him "by fraud, to injure his wife." Not only is the fraudulent intent difficult
to prove, but absent fraudulent intent there is no limit to the extent the
husband may donate community movables by particular title.
The provisions and gaps in the legislation being what they are, it is no
25. 287 So. 2d 497 (La. 1973).
26. An exception was made by LA. R.S. 9:3584 (Supp. 1975). The married
woman has no right to spend her earnings, though they are community funds. The

woman may, of course, obligate herself personally before or after marriage. If she
does so, but does not satisfy her creditor, he may obtain execution against any of her
separate assets and also, by this legislation, against her earningseven though they are
community assets. This legislation, therefore, gives the wife's creditor a security
right to be exercised against her earnings; but if her earnings are seized by her creditor
she will have to account to her husband for the amount on termination of the regime.
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wonder that accounting demands often have received solutions which do not
satisfy anyone. Some of the accounting decisions of the past year fit in that
category. They will be examined in the light of the remarks made above.
Life insurance
Article 2408 of the Civil Code was applied in T.L. James & Co.
v. Montgomery27 to reach the result that no compensation was owed by the
husband for premiums paid on his separately owned term life policy. The
reasoning seems to have been that, inasmuch as a term life policy never has a
cash surrender value, it cannot be said to have been "improved" or
"augmented" by the use of community funds. The same line of reasoning
was used in Connell v. Connel128 in which, on separation from bed and
board, the husband was allowed to recover one-half of that portion of the
cash surrender value of a life policy, considered the separate property of the
wife because it had been issued to her before marriage, deemed attributable
to the payment of premiums with community funds and one-half of the full
cash surrender value of a life policy issued the wife and considered a
community asset because it had been issued to her during marriage.
As admitted in Connell,29 the manner of dealing with such questions
has not been uniform. The real question, however, is not whether previous
decisions on the subject have been uniform, but whether article 2408 is
applicable at all to the issues. From the language of article 2408 itself it
seems that what is contemplated is an "increase" or "improvement" to a
separate asset such as land or even a movable of permanent value, perhaps a
jewel improved by cutting or mounting or a family portrait improved by
being placed in a suitable frame. There it seems fitting that the rule should
provide for an accounting of half the value of the "increases" or "augmentations" remaining at the end of the regime and appraised as of that time.
The community funds expended are to be treated as community investments, if you will, rather than as loans, so as to avoid the owner spouse's
having to pay the full cost of an improvement which has disappeared or
decreased in value and yet oblige him to reimburse the other spouse on a
scale commensurate with an increase in value attributable to the original
cost. Fair as the rule may be, then, for the restricted kinds of cases
mentioned, it does not seem at all appropriate when applied to premiums
paid on insurance policies the proceeds of which will not be community
assets, whether or not they may have a cash surrender value at any time.
27. 332 So. 2d 834 (La. 1976).
28. 331 So. 2d 4 (La. 1976).
29. Id. at 6, 7.
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The problem admittedly is not without difficulty and it is to be hoped
that the revision of the Civil Code now in progress through the efforts of the
Louisiana State Law Institute will produce rules of sufficient detail to do
justice in the particular situations which may arise. Some thoughts on the
subject in keeping with the rules as they are now and with the principles
underlying them nevertheless may be ventured.
The first notion demanding attention is that the husband is free to make
donations of community movables, without having to account therefor, if he
makes them without intent to defraud his wife of her eventual interest in the
community assets. Whether the policy is a separate asset or a community
asset, therefore, is irrelevant. There should be no accounting for premiums
paid on a policy issued to the husband before or after marriage, whether term
or otherwise, if the proceeds or avails are received by anyone other than the
husband, unless it can be shown that the intent was to defraud the wife. In
the latter instance the wife or her heirs should be allowed, at the end of the
regime, to recover from (the husband or) his heirs in accordance with the
rule of article 2404. If the husband or his heirs receive the proceeds or
avails, however, then it must be asked whether the wife consented to his use
of the community funds for his own benefit. In the latter case she very
properly can be considered to have made him a donation and no indemnification should be due her. If, on the other hand, the wife has not consented,
then the husband may not be allowed to use community funds for his selfish
benefit. The most basic principle underlying the community of gains is that
all advantages derived from the industry and assets of the spouses should be
shared by them. Articles 2406 and 2408 not properly covering the situation,
this principle must be implemented in an equitable manner under the
authority of article 21 of the Civil Code. If the policy was taken out during
marriage as well as paid for with community funds, the avails or proceeds
may be deemed to come to him or form part of his succession as community
assets, a conclusion already reached by the jurisprudence. 30 If the policy
was acquired before marriage, but the premiums paid in part with community funds, then indemnifying the wife for one-half the premiums paid with
community funds would not seem to be adequate. It would be consistent
with the basic principle mentioned and the equity demanded by article 21
that the wife be allowed to recover the largest of the following amounts:
one-half the premiums paid with community funds, or one-half that portion
of the cash surrender value or proceeds paid to the husband or his succession
that corresponds to that fraction of the total premiums which were paid with
30. See Comment, Insuranceand the Community, 25 LA. L. REV. 492,499-501
(1965), and the cases cited therein.
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community funds. It is true that under LA. R.S. 22:647 the cash surrender
value paid the husband during his life or the proceeds paid to his succession
on his death could not be executed against to satisfy the wife's claim, but
there is no reason why other assets of the husband or his heirs could not be
reached by her.
Premiums paid on life policies issued the wife before or after marriage,
however, must be treated differently. Contrary to the jurisprudence, such
policies are always separate assets of the wife, not community assets, for the
wife cannot acquire a community asset through the expenditure of community funds. This is so because since 1912 an asset is not a community
asset simply because it has been acquired during marriage. Under all
amendments to article 2334 since 1912 it is necessary that the funds used be
community funds and under article 2404 only the husband lawfully may
expend community funds. If the wife uses community funds without the
husband's consent, then she has misappropriated them to her own use, but
the policy she purchases with them is hers alone. If she uses community
funds with her husband's consent to purchase a policy in her own name, then
it must be assumed the husband has made her a donation of the premiums
and again the policy is hers alone. Finally if the husband purchases
insurance placing the policy in his wife's name the transaction once more is
a donative act and the policy is her separate property. For the same reason all
premiums paid by the husband or with his consent on policies issued the
wife must be considered donations to her not requiring any accounting. On
the other hand premiums paid by the wife on her policies with misappropriated community funds should give rise to the same solutions given above
for instances in which the husband uses community funds to pay premiums
on policies payable to him or his succession. There seems to be no reason
why they should be treated differently.
What has been said above is based entirely on the present legislation
and its underlying principles as the writer appreciates them to be. Were he to
recommend changes in the legislation, he would suggest that all premiums
paid on insurance policies for the benefit of the spouses or their dependents
be considered expenses of the marriage for which no accounting should ever
be due between the spouses. On the other hand, if insurance is made payable
to other persons, it would seem that the amount of premiums paid or of the
cash surrender value or proceeds realized, whichever is greater, should be
treated as unwarranted expenditures of community funds for which compensation should be given the non-consenting spouse.
Profit sharing and retirement plans
The most significant aspect of T. L. James & Co. v. Montgom-
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ery, 3' however, was its effort to provide a sort of arrt de rbglement on the
subject of employee profit sharing and retirement plans. The two main
conclusions reached in the opinion on rehearing authored by Justice Tate
may be restated as follows:
1. Employee profit sharing and retirement plan benefits reflect
earnings; hence that portion of any benefit corresponding to
earnings of an employee while married and living under the
community of gains is a community asset.
2. The employee's designation, on plan forms, of a "beneficiary" to
receive plan benefits on the death of the employee is an effective
contractualdesignation of a third party recipient of plan benefits
subject to the claims of (a) a surviving spouse under the community of gains [or other laws] and (b) forced heirs.
The writer long has urged that under the rules of the Louisiana
community of gains as they stand now such benefits are community assets.
Justice Tate noted this in his opinion and the writer hastens to add that he has
not changed his mind about it. There is a point, however, perhaps minor,
about which some comment must be made. Justice Tate states that "the
value of the right to share proportionately in the fund . . . falls into the
community [of that marriage] during which the contribution is made." As
pointed out earlier, 32 sums representing earnings fall into the community if
they were earned during the regime. If an employee married during a
certain year, for example, and contributions were made at the end of the year
for services rendered during the whole year, that year's contribution should
be proportionately a separate asset and a community asset.
There is no need for the writer to discuss in detail the court's approval
of the "contractual designation" of a beneficiary on death, for another of
his colleagues is doing SO. 3 3 For present purposes, at least, the writer
assumes the correctness of this view--one based on the legislative authorization for such designations implicit in various statutes34-and also as31.
32.

332 So. 2d 834 (La. 1976).
See text preceding note 18, supra.

33. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1975-1976 TermSuccessions and Donations, 37 LA. L. REv. 421, 435 (1977).

34. See 332 So. 2d at 854, 855 (in which Justice Tate cites and discusses the
implications of LA. R.S. 23:638 (1966) and 47:2404 C (1972)). This part of Justice
Tate's opinion deserves special recognition as an example of the manner in which
what is implicit in newer legislation should be understood to affect what is stated
differently in older legislation. Codes and collections of statutes cannot be amended
each legislative session to reflect perfectly the implications of new legislation. This
kind of revision can be made only periodically. In the meantime, the scholar and the
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sumes that the "contractual designation" is available to the wife as well as
the husband employee even though their regime is that of the community of
gains. These assumptions being made, however, it may be observed that a
surviving spouse hardly has any right to demand any portion of the benefit
from a "contractually designated" death beneficiary if he or she can receive
adequate value for his or her one-half interest in the community assets
(including the death benefit) by accepting other community assets in the
partition. The surviving spouse, in other words, should not be deemed to
have a right to the particular community asset disposed of through the
"contractual designation," but, as in other instances, only to one-half the
total of the community assets.3 5 In the same way, assuming again that the
"contractual designation" should be treated as if it were a donation so far as
forced heirs are concerned, the forced heir should be required to abide by the
rules on the order in which donations may be reduced in seeking to enforce
his right to a legitime. Any other solutions would be too much at variance
with the general law.
Improvements to separateproperty
One of the situations presented in Palama v. Palama36 involved the
right of the spouses as a result of (a) the expenditure of $15,000 in
community assets to improve the separate land of the husband, (b) the
increase in the value of the improvements to $25,000, (c) the loss of the
improvements through fire, and (d) the recovery by the husband of $25,000
in insurance proceeds in indemnification of the loss. The effect of the
judgment was to give each spouse $12,500, the correct amount, but the
reasoning of the court hardly conforms to the legislation.
The court reasoned that the use of $15,000 in community funds to
construct the improvements entitled each spouse to half that amount from
the insurance proceeds as his portion of "the community interest in the
separate property" of the husband, not by reason of article 2408, but by
reason of the advancement(?) or use(?) of community funds. Then the court
treated the difference between the amount of the community funds so used
($15,000) and the value of the improvements at the time of the fire
($25,000), or $10,000, as an "increase . . . due to community efforts"
scholarly judge must be depended upon to note what has happened and to construe
the law accordingly.
35. Thus the wife whose husband has alienated a community asset with the

intent to defraud her has no right against his transferee, who becomes owner, but only
a right to damages from him or his heirs. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2404.
36. 323 So. 2d 823 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

which the spouses should share under the rule of article 2408. It is submitted
that the correct reasoning would have been that the improvements belonged
to the husband, that the insurance proceeds ($25,000) therefore belonged to
the husband, that the value of the improvements at the time of the
dissolution of the regime was precisely the amount of the insurance
proceeds representing the burned improvements ($25,000), and therefore
that the husband, as owner of the proceeds representing the value of the
improvements, owed half their amount to the wife under the rule of article
2408.
Implicit in the court's reasoning was a misunderstanding of the
meaning of article 2408. Under that article, 37 as long as an "improvement"
to a separate asset is made through the expenditure of the spouses' energies
or common funds, the owner of the separate asset owes the other spouse
one-half the value of the improvement at the moment of the dissolution of
the regime, whether that value is greater or less than the value of the energies
or funds originally expended. The article does say that "no reward"
(remuneration) is due if the increase in the value of one spouse's separate
asset is attributable "only to the ordinary course of things, to the rise in the
value of property, or to the chances of trade," but this statement must be
understood to apply to increases in the value of property not improved
through the expenditure of common energies or funds. The key word is
"only." Once the improvement is made, the value of the improvement at
the time of dissolution, whether more or less than the value of the original
expenditure, is the basis of the accounting.
Improvements to community assets
There is no rule in the Civil Code expressly covering improvements to
community assets with separate funds. Article 2408 treats the converse
situation only. There is a gap in the legislation, therefore, and it must be
filled by invoking equity under the authority of article 21 of the Civil Code.
In seeking equity here, it seems most reasonable to apply the same kind of
rule provided for by article 2408. The rule for restitution, therefore, should
be that the spouse whose separate assets were used for the improvement
should be given one half the value of those improvements at the dissolution
37. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2408: When the separate property of either the husband
or the wife has been increased or improved during the marriage, the other spouse, or

his or her heirs, shall be entitled to the reward of one half of the value of the increase
or ameliorations, if it be proved that the increase or ameliorations be the result of the
common labor, expenses or industry; but there shall be no reward due, if it be proved
that the increase is due only to the ordinary course of things, to the rise in the value of
property, or to the chances of trade.
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of the regime. Palama v. Palama,38 however, based restitution on the
amount of separate assets used to improve a community asset without
inquiring into the value of the improvement attributable to the expenditure
as it stood at the time of the dissolution of the regime. A similar solution was
reached in Emerson v. Emerson,39 but there the error was compounded by
treating the wife as entitled to "paraphernalia" "delivered to her husband
[and] used for his benefit or for the benefit of the community." Civil Code
article 2391 and other legislation do allow the wife to recover paraphernalia
in his hands, but this was not such a case. The funds had been placed in a
joint account and apparently used with her consent to make alterations to the
family house, a community asset. Here a rule similar to that in article 2408 is
4
more appropriate. 0
Administration and fruits of the wife's paraphernalia
Under article 2386 of the Civil Code, before its amendment in 1944,
the fruits of the wife's paraphernalia were community assets unless she
administered the paraphernalia alone. Under the 1944 amendment to the
article, however, the fruits of the wife's paraphernalia are community assets
unless she has recorded a declaration "that she reserves all of such fruits for
her own separate use and benefit and her intention to administer such
[paraphernal] property separately and alone." The majority opinion in
Guilott v. Guilott4 1 construes the amended article to mean that, without the
recorded declaration, the fruits of the wife's paraphernalia are community
assets. Apparently counsel-and certainly a dissenting judge-argued that
the fruits of paraphernalia could be the wife's separate assets, in spite of her
failure to record the declaration, if she in fact administered the paraphernalia herself, thus treating the recordation of the declaration as no more than
one way in which the wife might prove her separate administration of the
paraphernalia. The writer submits that the amended article could not be

clearer on the necessity of the recordation of the declaration if the fruits of
paraphernalia are not to be considered community assets.
The dissenting opinion in Guilott, nevertheless, compels one to ask
whether the wife has any right to administer her paraphernalia, and
therefore, any right to demand the possession of those assets from her
husband, if she has not recorded the declaration mentioned in article 2386.
38.
39.
40.
So. 2d
41.

323 So. 2d 823 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975).
322 So. 2d 347 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1975).
A similar misapplication of art. 2391 is to be found in Guilott v. Guilott, 326
551 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976).
Id.
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Certainly there is room for doubt, but the writer submits that the wife should
not be deemed to have the right to demand possession of her paraphernalia
unless she has the right to retain its fruits. The whole tenor of the articles in
the Civil Code on matrimonial regimes is that the fruits of assets belong to
him or her who administers them, 42 and that, there being a community of
gains, the fruits of assets administered by the husband are community
assets. 43 Adherence to this plan would require that assets producing fruits
which are to be considered community assets should be subject to the
husband's administration, and therefore that the wife's paraphernalia
should not be demandable by her during marriage unless and until she has
recorded the declaration mentioned by article 2386.
A third point mentioned in Guilott-thoughprobably not relevant to
the facts in the case-needs to be considered. It is the position assumed in
Slater v. Culpepper," that the amendment to article 2386 in 1944 is
applicable, so far as fruits of paraphernalia realized after 1944 are concerned, even to community regimes contracted before the amendment.
Once more it is affirmed that the community of gains is contracted by the
spouses and therefore that its terms cannot be altered by legislation so as to
affect spouses already under the regime.45 It may be possible, nevertheless,
to view the particular change made in article 2386 by the legislation of 1944
as a change in a rule relating to the manner of proving the separate or
community character of the fruits of paraphernalia, rather than a change in
the substantive rights of the spouses under the regime, for now as before
1944 the wife has the right to administer her paraphernal assets and then to
keep their fruits. All that has been changed is that she must record the proper
declaration in order to exercise her substantive right.
42. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2386, 2388, 2396, and 2402.
43. Id. art. 2402. Under the article the fruits "of all the effects of which the
husband has the administration and enjoyment, either of right or in fact," are
community assets.
44. 223 La. 1071, 99 So. 2d 348 (1957).
45. See text at notes 1-6, supra.

